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PASSWORD-LESS CONTINUOUS MULTIFACTOR AUTHENTICATION (CFMA) 
FOR WIRELESS NETWORKS 
 








The new generation of wireless networks can involve a mix of radio technologies, 
especially for industrial environments. As devices roam back and forth between different 
radio networks, it is very difficult to continually monitor the security posture and identity 
of devices connected to the network.  Presented herein are techniques that involve the 
combination of a Device-Generated Trust Card and a Network-Generated Trust Card that 
can be used to validate device identity (e.g., an Internet of Things (IoT) device identity) 
and behavior using a continuous Multi-Factor Authentication (cMFA) structure.  
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
With the mix of many different radio technologies in current wireless networks, it 
can be difficult to continually monitor the security posture and identity of a device 
connected to a network as the device roams back and forth among different radio networks 
(e.g. Wi-Fi, 5G, etc.).  Most radio technologies perform a single authentication of a device 
at the time of association and then never examine the device again.  In the case of human 
users of a device, continuous Multi-Factor Authentication (cMFA) can be utilized via 
biometrics, etc. to continually ensure that the human is the correct user of the device.  
However, it is not possible to do this for a wirelessly connected machine that may use a 
variety of wireless access methods. 
Stated differently, there is currently no mechanism to provide differentiated access 
based on the state of a machine.  For example, when a machine behaves differently with 
excessive vibrations or heat, etc., it might be due to an ongoing cyber-attack or other issues 
(e.g., Stuxnet, etc.) that need to be treated differently based on device behavior.  Traditional 
methods of Subscriber Identification Module (SIM)/SIM-based authentication also do not 
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consider the machine state and its behavior on the network before providing access (which 
provides context to the device).  Even traditional Wi-Fi systems are looking forward to 
password-less authentication and on-boarding, but most methods involving Wi-Fi systems 
are targeted at identifying users as opposed to continuous authorization of machines on 
network.   
For example, authentication methods such as Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication 
or Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) allow a device 
to gain access to the network but once this access is gained, however, these methods do not 
implement any mechanisms to continuously validate if the device should still be allowed 
to communicate through the network.  
Thus, there is a need for a secure and efficient method for Wi-Fi cMFA that goes 
beyond standard methods of one-time authentication/authorization that is used in current 
communication systems. 
For critical communication systems that involve non-human connected devices, 
one-time authentication and authorization is not enough. This proposal provides a cMFA 
technique for wireless devices that continuously authenticates and authorizes devices.  
Figure 1, below, illustrates an example system flow that can be utilized in accordance with 
the techniques of this proposal in order to achieve continuous authentication/authorization 




Figure 1: Example System Flow for Continuous Authentication/Authorization of a Device 
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As illustrated in Figure 1 at (1), any machine/device within the environment is to 
host a cMFA agent in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The cMFA agent runs on 
the device and collects information about the device to which it is connected, such as: 
 Identity of the device (in various formats); 
 Running behavior and uptime of the device; and/or 
 IoT sensor data of the device (vibrations, temperature, pressure, etc.). 
 
This list of metrics can be used to create a real-time profile of the device called, 
referred to herein as a Device-Generated Trust Card that is continually updated with fresh 
data as it is collected on the device.  The Device-Generated Trust Card is reported to a 
Common Trust Engine (CTE) in the network, as discussed below.  
At (2), as the device communicates over the network, its interaction is continuously 
monitored using existing techniques of telemetry collection and a Network Generated Trust 
Card is generated and continually updated for this device. There are now two trust cards: 
the Device-Generated Trust Card and the Network-Generated Trust Card. The concept of 
trust decay can be applied to the two trust cards to continually update information about 
the behavior of the device. 
As shown at (3), a new entity referred to herein as the Common Trust Engine 
combines the Device-Generated and the Network-Generated trust cards to create a global 
Supervisory Trust Score (STS) for the device that is centrally stored and can be queried for 
various authentication and authorization purposes. The Supervisory Trust Score is meant 
to include the perspectives both from the device level (from the Device-Generated card) 
and from the network level (from the Network-Generated card), both of which are 
continually reassessed. 
When a device, such as an Automated guided Vehicle (AGV), tries to connect to 
the Wi-Fi network, the following operations can be performed, as shown at (4): 
 The Wi-Fi AP broadcasts support for trust-based MFA. This could be done in 
specific areas based on need (e.g., per AP group/Location); and 
 The device sends a request to initiate on-boarding by providing its unique 
Device-Generated Trust Card. It should be noted that the Device-Generated 
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Trust card can reveal anomalies in the device of which the network may not be 
aware. 
 
As part of the on-boarding process as shown at (5), the Device-Generated Trust 
Card is forwarded to the Common Trust Engine and the Common Trust Engine combines 
the Device-Generated Trust Card with the Network-Generated Trust Card (if one exists 
from previous behavior). If the device is a known device, the Supervisory Trust Score is 
updated. If the device is unknown to the network (e.g., a new device to the network), a 
Network-Generated Trust Card is created with default values until more information for 
the device is learned and the Supervisory Trust Score can be updated.   
Based on the Supervisory Trust Score (STS), the network policy may allow the 
device to continue to communicate with the network (if the score is high enough), may 
restrict the device (such as a quarantine, if the score is within one or more ranges), or may 
disconnect the device if the score falls below a critical value, as shown at (6). The Wi-Fi 
access point (AP) and/or network manager can continuously poll the trust engine to check 
the trust score. Anomalies can reduce the trust score and force the device into 
maintenance/limited interaction. 
Validation of the Device-Generated Trust Card can take several forms.  For 
example, 50 identical devices are expected to behave the same way, thus, one technique 
may involve a probabilistic comparison of trust card values between similar devices. 
Another technique may involve a mechanism such as Manufacturer Usage Description 
(MUD) to retrieve a card profile range for a target device from a vendor of the target device.  
In contrast, validation of the Network-Generated Trust Card is based on traffic activity and 
can utilize any known techniques for validation. 
As compared to other authentication mechanisms such as PSK or EAP-TLS, use of 
cMFA provides not only provides for the ability for a device to gain access to a network, 
but also provides for maintaining the access once connected.  Consider an example in 
which a device is allowed to access a network (via PSK or EAP-TLS) and establishes a 
secured connection to a server.  Thereafter, if the server is compromised, an attacker could 
use the trusted connection to push additional daemons to the device that could allow the 
device to explore the local area network.  EAP-TLS has no mechanism to prevent this issue. 
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However, following the techniques of this proposal, the device-generated trust score would 
suddenly drop in such a scenario.  For any peer-to-peer (P2P) exchange, the network would 
not detect anything (such as the value of the Device-Generated card) and for infrastructure-
based exchanges, the Network-Generated card would also be affected. Thus, the techniques 
proposed herein would detect such an attack. 
In summary, techniques presented herein involve the combination of a Device-
Generated Trust Card and a Network-Generated Trust Card that can be used to validate 
device identity and behavior using a cMFA structure. An advantage of such techniques is 
that anomalies or impersonations can be detected from either the device side or the network 
side of an authentication; thus, each side moderates possible poisoning from the detection 
logic of the other side. 
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